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Why Imprisonment Must go
By GILES PLAYFAIR*
Imprisonment is a punishment-with the exception of the
death penalty, the severest sanction at the disposal of the criminal
law. And a punishment, unless the dictionary lies, is retribution.
These perhaps obvious facts are stated emphatically, because
there is a tendency among contemporary penologists to gloss
over the first of them in order to deny the second. But one
cannot get rid of something inconvenient merely by saying that
it isn't there. Whether retribution is a euphemism for vengeance
or whether it is an expression of righteous disapproval may vary
according to circumstances and is always open to question. But,
whatever the case, retribution is indubitably a form of retaliation:
a payment which society exacts in the coinage of suffering, great
or small, be it death, imprisonment, fine or what you will.
Criminal sanctions are, of course, used for other purposes
besides retribution. At one time courts had a virtually unrestricted license to deal with law-breakers as they pleased, but
during the last century legislators throughout the greater part
of the civilized world grew increasingly ashamed of the savagery
and violence that characterized the administration of justice, and
they tried to give punishment a new rationale. This was the
rationale of deterrence, the concept of punishment to fit the
crime. Maximum and minimum penalties for every offence were
fixed by statute to accord with supposed deterrent needs.
But the courts were still left with a wide discretionary latitude
to act retributively-to punish offenders "according to their deserts."' In effect, indeed, this was an obligation which the statutes,
* Giles Playfair is an English barrister who formerly practiced at the criminal
bar in London and who has for many years been interested inpenal problems. He
has a fairly extensive acquaintance with the United States and was a visiting professor at the University of North Carolina in 1953 and 1954. He is an author and
a journalist.
1 In England some common law offences remained. For example conspiracy,
which could still be punished by prison sentences of unlimited mildness or
severity. Hence the gargantuan sentence, exceeding life in practice, recently passed
on spies and train robbers.
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excepting for those few that provided for a mandatory sentence,
imposed: an obligation frequently referred to by contemporary
judges as their "duty."
In England, the Judiciary has yet to make even a formal
renunciation of retribution as the ultimate objective of criminal
justice. "The sentence of the law," wrote Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen, "is to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to
any offence what a seal is to hot wax. It converts into a permanent
judgment what might otherwise be a transient sentiment." If it
is supposed there has been any change in the position of the
English Judiciary since Stephen's time, the answer is to be found
in a statement made by Lord Denning, the present Master of
the Rolls, to the Gowers Commission on Capital Punishment
(1948-55): "The punishment for grave crimes should adequately
reflect the revulsion felt by the majority of citizens for them. It
is a mistake to consider the object of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else. The ultimate
justification of any punishment is not that it is a deterrent but
that it is the emphatic denunciation by the community of a
crime. (My italics).
So long, then, as the power of dealing with convicted criminals by sending them to prison for greater or lesser periods is at
the disposal of a judiciary, imprisonment itself is bound to remain
primarily a means of punishment for punishment's sake, or in
other words a form of retribution. It has, however, become
fashionable to deny or avoid this fact; and, to judge from expressions of pious hopes and good intentions among legislators,
as well as slogans and promises that issue from executive
departments of Government, one might imagine that prison was
now a thoroughly beneficient institution, wholly dedicated to
reform. Thus it is said that people are no longer sent to prison
for punishment, but only as punishment.
Now if this means anything at all, it should mean, to begin
with, that every prisoner is treated alike, that none is subjected
to greater hardships than any other, that each is offered the same
opportunities of self-improvement. Is that the case? It might
conceivably become so, within a given jurisdiction, if the conditions of punishment by imprisonment were legally and exactly
defined. But they are not, of course, and one may doubt whether
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they ever could be. No legislature has ever attempted to set
precise and rigid limits to the sufferings that a prisoner may be
subjected to or, in other words, to specify qualitatively as well as
quantitatively just what retribution may be exacted from him.
In general, it would be fair to say that while a legislature authorizes punishment by imprisonment and a judiciary imposes it,
neither exercises any direct control over its execution. That is
left to administrators who have always had, and still retain, wide
discretionary powers. What punishment by imprisonment means
depends in practice, to a large extent, on what prison officials
want, and can afford, to make it mean. It is more or less painful
in effect as well as more or less reformative in design, according
to these two variables. And, understandably, there is no uniformity about it.
Again, if the concept of imprisonment as rather than for
punishment, were more than bureaucratic "double-speak", it
would mean that though a person might be punished through
being deprived of his liberty by judicial order, he would thereafter be subjected to no additional suffering or humiliation;
everything would be done to make his enforced stay in prison as
helpful and painless to him as possible. It has, indeed, been said
that this is precisely what the aim of a progressive penal policy
should be. Yet it is an aim that, under a retributive system of
justice, cannot logically be pursued.
For many classes of people, besides convicted offenders, are
subject to deprivation of liberty: lunatics, charged but untried
suspects, material witnesses, sufferers from virulently contagious
diseases such as smallpox; and, in a different sense, during a
national emergency, every physically and mentally fit man of
military age. But such people are not thereby being punished,
nor have they made themselves liable to punishment. Thus the
law, by implication at least, makes it inescapably clear that
imprisonment is a punishment, whereas deprivation of liberty in
itself is not. To equate the one with the other, and render them
indistinguishable would, under existing circumstance, be ethically, as well as legally, indefensible.
When a lunatic is confined in a mental hospital, it is not, even
though he has committed a crime, because he is held to owe
society any debt, but because society needs protection from him
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until such time as he has recovered his wits. Moreover, it can be
claimed at least with some theoretic justification that he is
confined "for his own good." Certainly, a modem mental hospital
is dedicated to curing its inmates; and there can be no doubt
that all lunatics need treatment and that all of them in principle
-since advances in medical knowledge are continually being
made-may eventually respond to it.
But though a judge may occasionally assure an offender that a
dose of imprisonment will be the making of him, this is a nasty
medicine that, however therapeutically desirable it may be considered, cannot be prescribed unless it is held to be "deserved";
nor, save in exceptional circumstances, prescribed in greater
measure than a court, after due reflection on its "duty", decides
is deserved.
Moreover, even assuming that prisons were wholly geared to
a reformative program, which certainly they are not, who as a
result would stand to benefit from being sent to them? Not,
surely, the Alger Hisses or the few white collar offenders who
were already well educated and professionally qualified people
before they made the slip that brought them into conflict with
the law. Not the much greater number of mental defectives
and others of weak intelligence, who are untrainable and untreatable, except by specialized methods in an institution adapted
to their needs. Not the still greater number of "short-timers"the drunkards, the prostitutes, the petty thieves, the minor sex
offenders and so on-who are in and out of gaol before any
reformative programme, ff it existed, could have the least chance
of helping them.
There is, in fact, no pretence made by a prison administration
anywhere in the world that "short-timers" are being offered
"training and treatment." Yet they represent by far the largest
group of prisoners at any given time. A European Working
Group reported to a United Nations Congress in 1960: "The
statistics supplied by the various countries [including the U.S.]
show that... sentences of six months and less form on the average more than 75% of all prison sentences. That proportion
shows the importance of the problem of short sentences and
brings out the distinct contrast in this respect between, on the
one hand, the legislations which provide for such penalties and
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the courts which apply them and, on the other, the teaching of
penological doctrine in which attention has for some time been
drawn to the highly undesirable aspects of this type of penalty."
(My italics).
These "highly undesirable aspects" were spelled out in a
further conclusion of the Working Group's report to the United
Nations Congress ".... Short sentences.., have all the drawbacks

of deprivation of liberty in any form with none of its advantages.
In fact, habituation to prison life, the danger of moral contamination and the break with the family and the social and occupational
environment are not, in this case, offset by any constructive contribution provided by a sufficiently lengthy treatment." (My
italics)
One way of avoiding these "deplorable consequences" is to
permit a short sentence to be served over a series of weekends
instead of continuously. This idea was initiated in West Germany
some years ago for adolescents, and was later extended to adults.
It has since been adopted in Belgium and South Africa.
In West Germany, apparently, weekend imprisonment was
originally intended as more than a device to prevent the loss of
employment and the serious interruption (or actual destruction)
of family life that a sentence served continuously involves. Some
hope was entertained that it might actually prove reformative,
when the judges agreed to visit the "weekenders" in gaol, and
lecture them on their civic responsibilities! However, the judges
soon wearied of this task; and weekend imprisonment, in West
Germany as in the other jurisdictions where it is being tried, is
undisguisedly punishment-and nothing else. What it really
amounts to-for it is an administrative, not a judicial concept-is
a declaration of no confidence in the reformative pretensions of
the prison system by those whose duty it is to maintain it in
operation. And indeed one may view nearly all the supposedly
progressive experiments undertaken by penal administrators, such
as open prisons, as attempts not so much to transform imprisonment into something positively beneficial for the individual as to
make it less damaging to him than it might otherwise be.
The courts, for their part, usually neither know nor care, when
they sentence a man, whether his time will be occupied in
productive work or mere drudgery; whether he will be kept in a
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closed institution or an open one; whether he will receive psychiatric help or whether he won't. From their point of view,
imprisonment is just a punitive instrument which they may or
may not think it proper to use in a particular case. So long as
this is so, so long as it is left for a Judiciary to decide who shall
and who shall not be imprisoned, it is plainly absurd to imagine
that the prison system is or ever can be even primarily dedicated
to reform.
What, however, of prevention? Isn't that a consideration
which makes imprisonment something which is indispensable in
itself, though its use ought to be greatly curtailed?
The argument is put simply with the rhetorical question:
"What do you do with dangerous or incorrigible criminals, if you
don't lock them up?" Or it is expressed in more academic
language by, for example, the late Professor Paul W. Tappan.
"No single few should be cleared to the criminalized," Tappan
wrote in 1960, "than the necessity of preventing the dangerous
criminal from repeating his offences, by coercive repressive
measures, even if these measures increase the difficulty in effecting his reformation. The incapacitationand intimidation of the
repetitive delinquent, sometimes termed "individual prevention',
is essential. The community cannot await the possible reformation
of criminals living under conditions of freedom while they continue to inflict injury on vital social interests."
One may readily agree that it would be no solution to the
problem posed by the dangerous or habitual criminal simply to
leave him at large. But the fallacy in Tappan's argument is that
under a retributive system of justice, whereby criminals, dangerous or not, are dealt with according to their supposed deserts,
"individual incapacitation" is more often than not impossible,
except for a limited period. And the fact is that throughout its
mournful history as a punitive measure, imprisonment, far from
halting recidivism, appears to have fostered it. Consequently,
while it has given "vital social interests" some temporary protection against criminal activity, it has often ended by putting
those same interests in greater jeopardy than ever before.
By contrast, the criminal lunatic-and for that matter, the
non-criminal lunatic-can always be "incapacitated" permanently;
and great indignation would certainly be caused, if it were
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seriously suggested that a time-limit, measured by the gravity of
his condition, should be placed in advance on his confinement.
Actually, the dividing line between the lunatic and a dangerous
criminal whom the law holds to be responsible for his actions is
apt to be a very thin one, but, so far as its own safety goes, society
deals far more sensibly with the one than with the other. It is
no longer believed, as it once was, that the lunatic can be
terrorized into becoming sane again. Instead, by means of a form
of indefinite confinement, which is nominally at least nonpunitive, he is rendered socially harmless until such time as he
recovers his senses either automatically or in consequence of
medical treatment. Not so the dangerous criminal' who, regardless of whether he is "reformed" or not, regardless of whether he
has been "intimidated" into behaving honestly and peaceably
or not, must be returned to the free community upon the
expiration of his prison sentence. Hence, unless that sentence
happens to be life, or so gargantuan that it amounts to the same
thing, society can never be permanently and indubitably safeguarded from him.
How ineffective the prison system actually is as a means of
prevention is shown by the fact that nearly all the worst and most
horrif3ing crimes are committed by graduates of penal establishments. The New York "monster", Albert Fish, for example,
eventually convicted of killing a small child whose body he
cooked and ate, had previously served several gaol sentences.
There might be some public alarm expressed, if a circus manager
were to announce that having found the way to tame wild
animals by cruelty, he intended to set all his lions and tigers
free after a certain period of service to him. And there might be
something more than public alarm expressed, if he stuck to this
policy after the experiment had been tried once and his animals
had proved themselves on release as savage as they ever were in
the jungle. Yet to maintain a prison system as a means of
"individual prevention," in the late Professor Tappan's sense,
seems hardly less eccentric.
Penologists further maintain, of course, that society cannot
afford to do without a prison system, if its offending members are
to be sufficiently discouraged from offending again and its law2 i.e. The criminal held to be responsible under the M'Naghten Rules.
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abiding members from offending at all. This is the deterrent
argument; and since Beccaria, Bentham and others founded the
so-called classical penology, it has come to be assumed that
deterrence, like prevention and reform, is an aim that can be
pursued quite separately from retribution. But-to repeat a point
-the fact that humanitarians revolted against a penal system
based on arbitrarily applied violence, the fact that they evolved
the theory that deterrence should be the principal objective of
punishment and that no punishment should be more severe than
was necessary to achieve that end (a clearly impossible assessment to make), the fact that they were eventually successful in
establishing imprisonment rather than violence and physical
torture as the backbone of the penal system, and in imposing
some semblance of uniformity on the sentencing powers of the
courts-none of this brought about any fundamental change in
the judicial concept of guilt and individual responsibility, or
altered the basic relationship between society and those who
violate its laws.
Now it may very well be that any kind of punishment deters
some people to some extent; and common sense would suggest
that if this is so, the more brutal the kind of punishment, the more
effective it is likely to be. It may also be that law and order
could not be maintained, if society were to abandon all punitive
sanctions. But this does not mean that a particular penalty is
necessary, desirable and justifiable simply because of its deterrent
potentiality. If it did mean that, one might confidently propose,
at a time like the present of a rising crime rate, a return to
presumptively more fearsome punishments. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the most retributive-minded of judges are those who
speak out most strongly in favor of such measures as the death
penalty. Recently, Lord Goddard, former Lord Chief Justice of
England, went so far as to suggest the re-employment of the
stocks, and one must at least credit him with the logic of his
convictions.
Whether imprisonment does in fact act as an effective deterrent against crime, or as a more effective deterrent than, say, a
fining system with teeth in it,3 is, of course, another matter. One
case.

3 i.e. Graded according to an offender's means and calculated to hurt in every
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can say with certainty that there are people, including the dangerous and habitual criminals aforementioned, whom it does not
deter. But since no scientific investigation that might supply a
reliable answer has even been made, it is anybody's guess what
manner of people, and how many, imprisonment does deter. The
same is true of the death penalty when and where it is still applical to crimes such as murder, treason and rape. For the staistical evidence commonly produced by abolitionists to "prove" that
the death penalty is not more deterrent than life imprisonment
can easily be exposed as misleading, or inconclusive.
Bernard Shaw pointed out that among normally balanced
people in a society the greatest deterrent is not man-made, but
God-given: the human conscience. And even though one may
believe that the law must have some sanctions at its disposal, it
seems certain that the essential difference between the nonrecidivist and the recidivist is the difference between a temporarily lapsed conscience, or a conscience in need of minor repair
and a conscience that is chronically weak, faulty or distorted.
But the point is that deterrence, though obviously not irrelevant to sound penal practice, is or should be subordinate to
the question of whether or not any given penalty is a morally
permissible one for a civilized society to use. Historically, this
seems hardly disputable, in spite of the fact that the theory of
the minimum deterrent, invented by the 18th century reformers
as a means of persuading society that it could adopt supposedly
more humane retributive measures at no added risk to its own
safety, has bedevilled penal policy ever since and has to a large
extent blocked humanitarian progress. For even if it could be
established beyond doubt that boiling malefactors alive were a
uniquely effective deterrent and would result in an immediate
and dramatic fall in the crime rate, one can safely assume there
would be no chance of its re-introduction. Actually, that most
barbarous of all English punishments was abolished as early as the
15th century, not because it failed to deter (one may assume,
had the issue been raised, that it would have been considered
extremely deterrent), but because it was held to have a degrading
influence on the onlookers. Taking the broad historic view,
therefore, if a punishment, whether deterrent or not, is indefensible on moral grounds for what it is, then it is not defensible at all.
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Now until the 18th century reformers got to work, imprisonment was simply a means of keeping suspected offenders in safe
custody until they could be tried, or of keeping convicted offenders in safe custody until they could be publicly liquidated at
the end of a rope or got rid of through transportation. Doubtless,
Bentham and his like genuinely believed that just as society had
no moral right to deal with its criminals by openly brutal and
violent methods, so it had a moral duty to make its "wicked"
members "good." Unfortunately, the system that was consequently evolved, though its brutalities were more easily cloaked
in righteousness, turned out to be no less destructively cruel than
the one that it replaced.
Again, this is not opinion. It is fact, in the sense that social
history has already condemned as barbaric prison conditions of
the 19th century which, through imposing total isolation by means
either of solitary confinement or of a rigid enforcement of silence,
sent some men mad and drove others to suicide. Yet these
conditions did not provenly fail in the deterrent part of their
purpose; still less, have they been replaced since by conditions
of provenly greater deterrent effectiveness.
For example, the English prison system was at its most coldly
and calculatedly punitive between 1878 and 1898 when under
the Du Cane regime the policy of "hard labour, hard fare and a
hard bed" was in full force, and during that time the general
crime-rate steadily fell. Why, then, were reforms instituted?
Why was the tread-wheel abolished? The reason given in Parliament was that Du Cane's system, for all its success as a general
deterrent, had utterly failed to halt recidivism. But, in retrospect,
that reason, though true so far as it went, cannot be said to
explain Parliament's intervention. For the liberal reforms that
were instituted then, and others that have followed since, while
possibly weakening and certainly not strengthening the deterrent
effectiveness of imprisonment, have not solved the problem of
recidivism, either. Yet one may be reasonably certain that today
there would be as much social resistance to reverting to solitary
confinement, the rule of perpetual silence and forced labour at
the tread-wheel as there would be to restoring the stocks, the
pillory, the ducking-stool, and other penalties long since repealed
as intolerably cruel. Thus one may conclude that whenever the
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prison system has been "reformed", it was because its rigours and
brutalities had become too much for society's conscience to bear.
But this raises the central question. Was the prison system
ever sufficiently reformable, that is to say, transformable from a
moral wrong into a moral right? Is it now?
Bernard Shaw, in his preface to the Webbs' account of English
Prisons under Local Government, published in 1922, wrote
sardonically of contemporary penal reformers as "philanthropists
bent on reforming a necessary and beneficent public institution,"
and compared them with John Howard and the other 18th century pioneers who "had . . . made the neglect, oppression,

corruption, and physical torture of the old common gaol the
pretext for transforming it into that diabolic den of torment,
mischief, and damnation, the modem model prison." Yet at least
it can be said for the creators of Millbank in London and, before
them, the creator of the American penitentiaries in Pa. and
New York that they were fundamentalists-advocates, within
limits, of a new penology. Though they quarrelled a good deal
among themselves about ways and means-about the rival merits
of "silence" and "separateness", work and spiritual guidancethey all believed that if criminals were confined, and at the same
time prevented from contaminating one another, they could be
induced to see the error of their ways. It was a simple and
appallingly misguided theory, but in its time it was a radical one
that had radical results.
By contrast, the reformers of the past forty years (and more)
have, in general, been mere tinkerers: well-intentioned woodmen
trying to prop up a tree with rotten roots. Imprisonment as the
mainstay of punitive justice is for them, apparently, an immovable
fact of life, with the result that penology has become bogged
down in unrealistic arguments about the rival claims of "deterrence" and "rehabilitation." An allegedly "progressive" penal
policy is directed, as has been said, toward alleviating the
inherent cruelty of imprisonment and to minimising its destructive consequences. 4 The logical conclusion to be drawn from
such a policy is that the thing it is trying to correct is an evil in
itself, and had better be abolished. But this is a conclusion which
contemporary reformers decline to face. Instead, they make
4 E.g. Weekend imprisonment, supra.
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nonsense of the whole theory upon which the prison system
was based, through weakening the (presumptive) deterrent of
imprisonment effectiveness, on the one hand, and undermining
its rehabilitative method, on the other. John Howard was surely
right in denouncing the common goals, where men and women
awaiting trial or punishment were herded indiscriminately together, as "schools of crime", just as he was right in believing
that society should attempt to reform rather than eliminate its
law-breakers. What was wrong, provenly and disastrously wrong,
was his remedy. But it is no radical substitute for this remedy
to permit, for example, "association"-to allow prisoners to eat
together, enjoy a certain amount of recreation together, talk to
one another at work or exercise. That is merely to re-introduce,
in the name of humanitarianism, the very danger of moral corruption and mutual contamination among criminals that the
modem model prison" was designed to remove.
If a patient returned to his doctor with a half empty bottle of
medicine, complaining that the stuff had done him harm and no
good, he would hardly be reassured if the doctor simply filled
the bottle up with water, thus diluting the original prescription,
and told him to try again. But that essentially is what attempts
to reform the prison system amount to; and it is not surprising
that while the crime rate has moved upwards, the problem of
recidivism seems no nearer solution than it was a hundred years
ago.
It may still be asked, however, whether the system has been
sufficiently watered down to make it morally harmless. Or, to put
the question in another way: If one assumes that no more
effective method exists of preventing crime, is society justified
in the second half of the 20th Century in continuing to punish
people by imprisonment?
Here the answer that Bernard Shaw gave in 1922 still seems
valid. Shaw not only called the prison system extremely cruel,
but denounced it as a fraud. It is a fraud, first of all, Shaw said,
because the retributive theory to which it is bound is in itself
fraudulent. The convicted offender who is sent to prison is given
an express or implied assurance, in society's name, that when he
has served his sentence, the slate will be wiped clean. But this
is a bargain that society almost invariably dishonors. If a person
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accepts a prison sentence as his "just deserts", it is only to discover
in the end that he has been cheated; the payment that was said
to be the debt he owed and that has been exacted from him in
full is not accepted as payment at all. On the contrary, if he is
able to re-establish himself in the free community, it will be in
spite of, rather because of, the fact he has "done time."
Shaw further described the reformative claims of the prison
system as fraudulent on the grounds that "to punish and reform
people by the same operation," is like putting a man suffering
from pneumonia out in the snow all night, and then feeding him
with unpleasant-tasting lozenges. Admittedly Shaw made this
point before the psychiatrists and psychologists came to the aid
of the prison service, but it is surely as true now as it always has
been that the objectives of treatment and punishment are fundamentally irreconcilable: the one is to "make well", the other to
"make ill."
Yet the objective of punishment remains embedded in the
prison system because penal administrators, for all the essential
lack of faith which they sometimes evidence in the efficiency
and morality of their own work, cannot help being aware that
ultimately they are the servants of the criminal law and are
bound to execute its punitive orders. They have never said that
imprisonment should not be a punishment at all; they have only
tried, the more progressive among them, to make themselves
(and the rest of us) believe that imprisonment can be curative
as well as punitive.
In fact, prison life, though it is less inhumanly abnormal
than it used to be, is still a calculated cruelty; and, as Gresham
Sykes has pointed out in a detailed study of an American penitentiary, its "pains" are in the final analysis inextricable from
what the concept of punishing malefactors by isolating them
from the free world for prescribed periods means and is bound
to mean. Sykes describes prison inmates as a "captive society"
ruled by an administration with totalitarian powers. The extent
to which the rulers govern benevolently or oppressively depends
partly on how little or how much trouble they are willing to
spare themselves in discharging their prime responsibility of
keeping all the inmates safely confined, and partly in turn on
how hidebound they are by conventional ideas of what this
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necessitates. "Security," said the English Prison Department in a
recent report, "must be an important consideration even in the
most progressive penal system, because, apart from the public
duty of holding in custody those whom the courts have sentenced
to imprisonment it is, of course, axiomatic that a prisoner cannot
be trained in absentia." That is an understatement, and the last
part of it something of a sophistry. As all penal administrators
are perfectly well aware, society does not consider them to have
failed in their "public duty" when they discharge prisoners who
are unreformed. Society does, however, blame them if they don't
"hold" a person "in custody" for as long as a judge has said he
should be held. Screaming headlines report the news that an
"escaped prisoner" has committed a further crime, but a discharged prisoner who offends again on the day of his release will
be unlikely to make the papers at all.
So long as this attitude persists, prison administrators will risk
being liberal only to the degree that the safe custody of their
most recalcitrant charges is thought to allow, and if this means
the thwarting or impeding of the rehabilitative programme
(whatever that may be), then rehabilitation as an aim is sacrificed. It invariably does mean that in any closed institution the
inmates who are not "escape risks" or troublemakers-often the
great majority-have to be disciplined as though they were. There
is a statutory provision in England, echoed in many other jurisdictions, that the "treatment of prisoners shall be such as to
encourage their self-respect and a sense of personal responsibility." Generally speaking, a provision of this kind is flagrantly
violated by the regime as a closed prison or penitentiary, unless it
can be seriously maintained that to strip a man of all his democratic rights (and responsibilities), to deny him any say in the
management or organization of the society in which he is
compelled to live, to regulate his life by orders and hardly ever
to permit him to act on his own initiative, to lock him up in a cell,
as though he were some dangerous animal who might otherwise
get loose, and even then to keep him under regular observation
-that such treatment is to encourage his self-respect and sense
of personal responsibilityl The truth is that even if that were
the only possible method of guaranteeing the safe custody of all
the inmates of any given prison (the "escape risks and trouble-
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makers," included), which is open to question, it would still be
blatantly antireformative, and in most cases pointlessly oppressive.
Nor are all the hardships and indignities that a prisoner
suffers defensible or explicable on security grounds alone. It is
worth repeating that efforts to humanise prison life have led,
paradoxically, to the abandonment of some policies that were
originally supposed to be reformative rather than punitive,
notably solitary confinement and/or the Rule of Silence. On the
other hand, certain practices survive which are plainly punitive,
not only in effect, but in intent. For example, though labor is,
on the average, no longer nearly as hard as it was once was, it is
still forced; the most privileged of prisoners do not normally
receive better than a sub-standard ex-gratia payment for their
work. Consequently, the freedom that a prisoner may have to
purchase tobacco and certain other luxuries is so severely curtailed
that it produces its own kind of starvation. This, in turn, is the
direct cause of one of the most glaring evils of contemporary
prison life-the existence of the "Tobacco-Baron," an illicit trader
who preys on the smoke-hungry state of his fellow inmates and
uses strong-arm methods to enforce his demands. Again, except
in a few institutions throughout the civilized world,5 prisoners
are subjected to total heterosexual starvation; and this results in
widespread instances of unlawful homosexuality, which would
doubtless shock John Howard even more than the promiscuity
between men and women that he discovered in the common gaols
of England.
But even if no such strictures as the above could fairly be
made, it would still be generally true to say of the prison system
that it "endeavours to make men industrious by driving them to
work; to make them virtuous by removing temptation; to make
them respect the law by forcing them to obey the edicts of an
autocrat; to make them far-sighted by allowing them no chance
to exercise foresight; to give them individual initiative by treating
them in large groups; in short, to prepare them again for society
by placing them in conditions as unlike real society as they could
well be made." Those words were written more than half a
century ago by Thomas Mott Osborne, himself an American
prison administrator. Osborne tried to meet his own devastating
5
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criticism of the system by introducing a form of self-government
at first at Auburn and later at Sing Sing. But this experiment,
though it flourished for a while, eventually foundered, just as
similar experiments had foundered before and have foundered
since. Indeed, the student of prison history may wonder whether
it is possible so much as to imagine any such apparently pioneering venture that has not already been tried-only, iR the end, to
wither and die of its own accord or to be stifled.
In short, punitive imprisonment appears to have proved itself
an irredeemably poisonous institution. For that fundamental reason, it is historically doomed, and, in the writer's opinion, the
sooner it goes the better. How, then, should it be replaced?
To answer this question very briefly, no one can tell to what
extent it might be possible to deter crime through the planned
development of a morally acceptable form of retribution such as
fining, which is already, of course, being widely employed by the
courts. At the same time, there is now a recognized alternative
to punishment as a defense against crime, and that is treatment.
This is not to imply adoption of the extreme determinist view
that all lawbreakers are "sick" people who cannot help themselves
and should not be held responsible for their actions. It is to say,
however, that when punishment fails to deter, society should,
in its own interest, have resort to treatment as an alternative
means of prevention. But if treatment, whether medical or
sociological, is to have any real chance of success, then the
commitment to it, once it is called into play, must be total. This
means essentially that it cannot be used as an instrument of
retributive justice, for other considerations apart, if one wants
to cure a person of pneumonia one does not sentence him to a
fixed number of days in bed, and equally, if one is intent on
teaching an untutored child to read, one does not prescribe for
him an arbitrarily fixed period of tuition. Thus the abnormality,
social or mental, and hence the non-responsibility of offenders
proved to be undeterred or undeterrable by a morally acceptable
form of punishment, should be presumed. They would then be
liable to treatment over an indefinite period and under strictly
non-punitive conditions in the same way that certified lunatics
are.
It does not follow from this that every convicted offender
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found to be in need of treatment would have to be deprived of
his liberty. On the contrary, custody as a concomitant of treatment, should only be permitted as a last resort and its use should
be subject to the strictest safeguards against abuse of individual
rights. In fact, while one must assume that there will always be a
certain number of offenders too dangerous to be left at large,
there are undoubtedly many others who could be successfully
treated in freedom. Probation, though it needs to be widely
developed and re-conceived as a treatment method rather than
as a 'last chance", already points the way to this.
But space is too limited to be concerned with details. What
this paper has set out to demonstrate is that there can be no true
penal progress short of the abolition of punitive imprisonment
and an end to the confusion between retribution and reform.

